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THE MASSACHUSETTS RULE IN THE
DENVER COUNTY COURT
DONALD C. McKINLAY
of the Denver Bar

By a recent decision I the County Court of the City and County
of Denver settled a question which has been troubling Colorado
executors and trustees for many years.
The question was this: Were the income beneficiaries of a
residuary trust entitled to all of the net income earned during the
period of administration, or were they entitled only to that portion of such net income which was earned by the "clear residue,"
i.e., by those assets which remained at the end of administration
and which went into the trust?
In the actual case presented to the County Court $15,350.92
of net income was earned by the gross assets of the decedent's
estate during the period of administration. The Executor and
Trustee, by formula, ascertained that of this total amount $3,082.85
was earned by those assets which were sold during administration
to pay claims, taxes and costs of administration. Since these assets
never became a part of the "clear residue" delivered to the Trustee at the close of administration, the Executor and Trustee, following a rule originating in England, determined that the $3,082.85
should become principal and added to the corpus of the testamentary trust.
The life beneficiaries of the trust protested and contended
that all of the net income earned during the period of administration, to-wit, $15,350.92, should remain income and be paid to
them. They relied upon the so-called Massachusetts Rule and
upon the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Mulcahy v.
Johnson, 80 Colo. 499, 252 P. 816.
Following a hearing and the filing of briefs, Judge David
Brofman for the Denver County Court held that he would follow
the so-called Massachusetts Rule and thereupon ordered that all
of the net income earned during administration be paid to the
life beneficiaries of the residuary trust. No appeal to a higher
court was made. The Executor-Trustee accepted this decision and
paid the life beneficiaries accordingly.
By her will the testatrix had directed that her entire residuary estate be placed in trust. She then provided:
I direct the Trustee to pay one-half of the net income derived from the trust estate to my daughter .
during her life, and to use one-half of the net income of
the said trust for the proper care and maintenance of
my son . . during his life.
In the Matter of the Estate of Elsie Billingsley Laforgue, Denver County
Court No. 78523, Petition of the Executor and Testamentary Trustee for Instructions, Findings and Order of December 29, 1952.

Mar., 1953

DICTA

The survivor of her son and daughter was to receive the entire
net income of the trust and upon the death of such survivor the
trust was to terminate and the corpus distributed to the testatrix's
.heirs at law.
No attempt will be made to repeat in detail the authorities
cited and the arguments advanced by both sides as a short summary will suffice for most readers.
Both sides acknowledged that there was a definite split of
authority in the United States, and each argued that the rule it
propounded was the "majority rule." 2_, The Executor and Trustee
pointed out that the English Rule had been adopted by the authors
of the Restatement of Trusts in 1935.: The life beneficiaries, on
the other hand, pointed to the "currently very noticeable" trend
since 1935 toward the Massachusetts Rule and predicted that the
authors of the Restatement would amend their position. In several states, notably New York, the courts first adopted the English
Rule, but the legislatures by subsequent statutes established the
Massachusetts Rule.
Mulcahy v. Johnson, supra, was thoroughly discussed as the
facts and decision in that case were closer to the issue before the
Court than any other known Colorado case. For all practical
purposes the trust provisions in Johnson's Will were the same
as those in the subject Laforgue Will. Considerable income was
earned during the period of administration of Johnson's estate
($15,594.60 net). His executors paid all of this income to the
testamentary trustees who treated it as corpus and paid none of
it to the life beneficiaries. The beneficiaries brought an action
against the trustees for an accounting. The trial court denied
the accounting, but on appeal the Supreme Court of Colorado
reversed the decision below and held that the life beneficiaries
were entitled to all of the net income earned during administration. The Court did not state specifically whether this meant the
income earned by the "clear residue" of the estate or whether it
meant all of the income, even that earned by assets used to pay
claims and costs of administration.
One of the questions in the instant case was whether the
English Rule versus the Massachusetts Rule issue had been presented to the Court in the Mulcahy case. The following statement
was found in the Answer Brief of the Johnson trustees:
It seems to be the theory of the plaintiff, based on
the evidence introduced, that the life beneficiaries are
entitled to the whole net earnings made by the executors
"2

'Proponents of English Rule claimed England, the District of Columbia and
eight states: Conn., Del., Ky., Nebr., N. H., N. J.,Ore. and Vir., as following
the English Rule.
2' Proponents of Massachusetts Rule claimed twelve states: Conn., Md.,
Mass., Minn. N. Y., N. C., Ohio, Okla., Pa., R. I., Tenn., and Vir. (Conn., Md.,
N. Y., Pa. and Vir. by statute).
Restatement of Trusts, Section 234, Comment "g."
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out of the testator's entire estate during the twenty
months management from death to discharge. The witness Trant stated (fol. 292) that the whole net income
on the whole estate was $15,594.60, based upon his method
of computation as an accountant, and this is the amount
claimed by plaintiff for all life tenants. Even though the
advisory rule invoked by the plaintiff be held controlling
in tlhis case, it is only the net income from that part of
the whole estate which was put in trust that belongs to
the life beneficiaries. (Emphasis added.)
It would seem that the portion italicized, although not so labeled,
was an argument for the application of the English Rule.
In the Reply Brief of the plaintiff life beneficiaries in the
Mulcahy case is found this statement, which, unless read in the
light of the Supreme Court's ultimate decision, is somewhat ambiguous:
We agree with the statement on Page 20 of the
Brief of Defendants in Error that 'it is only the net
income from that part of the whole estate which was
put in trust that belongs to the life beneficiaries' but
counsel fails to define 'that part of the whole estate which
was put in trust.' We submit that it is all of the estate
of the testator owned by him at the time of his death,
less devises, bequests and corpus charges.
The legacies were paid, the devises distributed, the
charges made, by the executors during the period of administration. The rest of the estate constitutes the trust
res or corpus. This corpus earned money during the period of administration. Certain expenses of earning the
money were deducted and the net income remaining was
$15,594.60.
Unfortunately there are no other details in the Mulcahy v.
Johnson briefs, and one must draw his own conclusions from the
above quotations and from the Court's decision, as to whether
the issue here described was actually considered and decided by
the Colorado Supreme Court in the Mulcahy case. It seems clear
to the writer that the Colorado Supreme Court in that case, when
confronted with an issue parallel to the one in the instant case,
handed down a decision which was consistent with the Massachusetts Rule, and in conflict with the English Rule, for it held
in substance that all of the net income earned during the period
of administration belonged to the life beneficiaries of the testamentary trust. The Court's exact statement is found on page
507 of 80 Colorado, and reads as follows:
Of course, the gross income earned during the period of administration could not properly be distributed
to the life beneficiaries. It was only the net income that
they were entitled to. Certain deductions must be made
from the gross income, like taxes on improved property,
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insurance, heat and light, ordinary repairs and maintenance and other like matters enumerated in plaintiff's
brief. The amount of the net income resulting, after the
the deduction of costs of earning the money collected during the period executorship, is the sum of $15,594.60.
This net income was earned by the executors during administration and up to the time they distributed the trust
estate to themselves as trustees. The decree of the court
in this particular was wrong and it is necessarily so as
the result of our conclusion upon the time when the income begins to run. This net income belongs to the life
beneficiaries and should be paid over to them. * * *
Those who argue for the English Rule contend that it is the
logical rule because a testator, when he speaks of "the net income
from the trust," means just that and not also the income from
those assets which never reach the trust. They contend that the
Massachusetts Rule creates a windfall for the life beneficiaries
which testators do not contemplate. They believe that it is better
and more in accord with the intent of most testators that the
"additional income" be added to the corpus so as to make more
certain the existence of an adequate trust fund for the entire
life of the beneficiaries.
On the other hand the proponents of the Massachusetts
Rule
point out that the English Rule has been severely criticized because of the many difficulties of accounting inherent in its application; that the Massachusetts Rule offers a clear and simple rule
upon which a testator may rely, if he so desires, or from which
he may depart if he so writes his will; that the Massachusetts Rule
has been approved by experience as more reasonable and practical than the English Rule; and that it is in accord with the
general rule in practically all jurisdictions, including Colorado,
that in all doubtful cases the interests of the life tenants are to
be preferred to the interests of the remaindermen. They emphasize that the Massachusetts Rule, and not the English Rule, best
provides for carrying out the testator's intent by providing for
the payment of the income in question to the life beneficiaries,
who are normally the first object of his concern, rather than
accumulating and capitalizing it for more distant remaindermen.
Whether the Colorado Supreme Court in Mulcahy v. Johnson,
supra, intended to adopt for Colorado the Massachusetts Rule and
discard its opposite, the English Rule, may continue to be the
subject of some debate. However, since the decision in the subject estate on December 29, 1952, it seems clear that the County
Court of Denver intends to follow the Massachusetts Rule pending any final determination by the Colorado Supreme Court.

